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Abstract 
We investigate how the oil and gas project companies’ decisions to hedge the risk of future 
prices of oil and gas respond to the changes in the price volatility of oil and gas, especially 
the role of the exposure of the sponsor company’s stock returns to the risk of oil and gas 
prices. With a sample of 328 loans made to oil and gas development projects in 30 countries 
during 1996-2011 period, we find that the oil (or gas) price volatility increases the oil (or gas) 
project company’s hedging likelihood, especially to a greater extent for the case in which the 
sponsor company’s oil (or gas) exposure is smaller. Our findings suggest that the sponsor 
company’s willingness to reduce its exposure to the risk of oil and gas prices increases the 
likelihood that the subsidiary project company will hedge the risk of future prices of oil and 
gas. 
 
Keywords: Risk management; Price volatility; Project finance; Oil risk exposure; Oil and gas 
development. 
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1. Introduction 
Motives for and consequences of corporate risk management have received a great deal of 
attention (Nance et al., 1993; Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Campello et. 
al, 2011). But, less is known about the oil and gas firms’ incentives to hedge the risk of future 
prices of oil and gas, albeit the importance of such a price risk in determining these firms’ 
cash-flow volatilities. This paper investigates the determinants of oil and gas firms’ decisions 
to hedge the risk of future prices of oil and gas for the case of oil and gas development 
projects. 
Oil and gas development projects are often financed via project finance loans: For instance, 
an energy firm (e.g., Exxon Mobil), creates a standalone subsidiary project company (i.e., 
spin-off), provides it with the equity capital (often less than 30 percent of the total capital 
raising), and arranges loans from the lenders. By doing this, such an energy firm, labeled 
sponsor company, can avoid the rise of its own leverage ratio and effectively transfer to the 
lenders (e.g., a consortium of international banks) a large fraction of the risk associated with 
the oil and gas development project, while retaining management control and ownership of 
the project. As a result, the lenders are subject to a high level of credit risks given that a 
project loan’s repayment is mainly made from the project’s future cash flows, without much 
collateral assets. Given the large amount of funding and high level of risks involved in a 
project loan, the lenders often require the sponsor company to arrange various contracts with 
the third parties related to the project (e.g., buyers of the produced oil and gas) to reduce the 
project’s future cash-flow risk to a bearable level.  
The risk of future prices of oil and gas is one of the most important risk factors that 
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determine the project company’s credit risk (Keefe and Yaghoubi, 2016). The reason is that 
an oil (or gas) project company’s cash flows are generated almost entirely from the sales of 
oil (or gas). As such, at the time of a loan application, an increase in the oil price volatility 
observed in the near past, predicting the persistently high volatility of future oil prices, is 
likely to increase the oil project company’s incentive for hedging the risk of future oil prices 
(Jin and Jorion, 2006) so as to mitigate the effect of such a price volatility on the borrowing 
cost. This has not been, however, studied much in the literature. We fill this gap by examining 
how an increase in the price volatility affects the likelihood of hedging in oil and gas 
development projects.  
Importantly, oil and gas project companies exhibit substantial differences in their decisions 
to hedge the price risk, despite the readily available hedging tools (e.g., oil and gas 
derivatives, actively traded globally).
1
 For instance, an oil project company can effectively 
hedge the risk of future oil prices by arranging an oil offtake contract that fixes the price, 
volume, and delivery date of the future sales of oil. The adoption rate of such an offtake 
contracts, as documented in this paper, varies greatly both across companies and over time. 
Energy firms may, in theory, differ in their costs and benefits of hedging the price risk of oil 
and gas. We aim to empirically investigate the determinants of the oil and gas project 
companies’ decisions to hedge the price risk.  
In particular, we focus on the sponsor company’s stock-return sensitivity to the changes in 
the price of oil (or the price of gas for a gas project), labeled sponsor’s oil (or gas) beta, as a 
determinant of the sensitivity of the project company’s hedging likelihood to the price 
volatility. More specifically, we estimate the sponsor’s oil (or gas) beta over a one-year 
                                           
1
 The trading volume of oil and gas derivatives has already grown rapidly in the 1980s, whereas our sample 
period begins in 1996. 
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period (ending six months before the project loan date) by regressing the sponsor’s daily 
stock returns on the two factors (Sadorsky, 2001; Basher and Sadorsky, 2006; Jin and Jorion, 
2006): (i) return to the market portfolio (where the sponsor’s stock is traded) and (ii) return to 
the oil (or gas) price.  
Our estimation results show that for the top-20 sponsor companies (sorted by the total size 
of their project loans), the correlation coefficient between the sponsor’s oil and gas beta and 
the hedging likelihood of oil and gas projects owned by the sponsor is negative, about -0.35. 
This suggests that the sponsor’s oil beta negatively affects the likelihood that the subsidiary 
oil project company will hedge the risk of future oil prices.  
We proceed to formally investigating the determinants of the likelihood that an oil and gas 
project company hedges the price risk of oil (or gas) by using an offtake contract. We run a 
logit regression of the hedging dummy (indicating whether or not an offtake contract is 
adopted as of the loan date) on the two key variables: (i) one-year moving average of the oil 
(or gas) price volatility and (ii) interaction term between such a price volatility and the 
sponsor’s oil (or gas) beta. We also control for loan/tranche-, industry-, host country-, and 
global-level variables that might affect the project company’s credit risk and hence incentive 
for hedging (Corielli et al., 2010; Hainz and Klemeier, 2012).  
The data on the loan/tranche-level microeconomic characteristics (e.g., loan size, maturity, 
refinancing, etc.) comes from Dealogic ProjectWare database (Corielli et al., 2010); it 
provides information on 328 loan tranches made to 150 oil and gas development projects in 
30 host countries over the monthly sample period, from April 1996 to October 2011. We 
control for (constant) credit rating and (time-varying) government bond spread as proxies for 
the regional risk factors specific to the host country where the project is located.  
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Our logit regression results show that for an increase in the oil price volatility, an oil 
project company is more likely to adopt an offtake contract to hedge the risk of future oil 
prices, especially to the extent greater for the case in which the sponsor company’s oil beta is 
smaller. The marginal effect of an increase in the interaction term between the price volatility 
and the sponsor’s oil and gas beta on the probability of offtake adoption is economically 
significant: an increase in this interaction term from 25
th
 percentile to 75
th
 percentile is 
associated with a decrease of 5.13 percentage points in the probability of offtake adoption. 
For comparison, the marginal effect of an increase (from 25
th
 percentile to 75
th
 percentile) in 
the price volatility increases the offtake-adoption probability by 0.39 percentage points. 
 Our findings support that an energy firm’s hedging policy responds sensitively to the 
changes in the market environment relevant to the risk of the company’s future cash flows. 
Furthermore, note that a sponsor company with the stronger willingness to manage its own 
exposure to the oil price risk would have exerted more effort to insure its business and hence 
its frim value against the oil price shocks so that the company’s stock returns would have 
been less sensitive to the oil price shock. Thus, our findings also suggest that a sponsor 
company’s willingness to reduce its own exposure to the oil price risk is also persistently 
observed in the case of its subsidiary project company’s risk management practices: the 
smaller the sensitivity of the sponsor company’s stock returns to the oil price risk, the higher 
the likelihood that its subsidiary project company will also hedge the oil price risk. Put 
differently, a sponsor company’s oil beta, which is easily observable, can be useful in 
predicting the subsidiary project company’s decision to hedge the oil price risk, which is 
valuable information to lenders, other investors and third parties involved in the project.  
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the determinants of energy companies’ 
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risk management practices (Berkeley et al., 1991; Zhi, 1995; Thuyet et al., 2007). Berkeley et 
al. (1991) and Zhi (1995) discuss how the ex-ante risk management techniques can support 
project managers in development of projects. Thuyet et al. (2007) identify the major project 
risks based on a questionnaire survey in oil and gas industries in Vietnam, whereas our 
sample covers a number of oil and gas project companies in 30 countries. As for empirical 
studies of oil and gas project finance loans, Dailami and Hauswald (2007) investigate the 
determinants of the credit spread for a single gas project in Qatar, and Pierru et al. (2013) 
study the capital structure of LNG infrastructures and gas pipeline projects financed by 
project loans. This paper investigates determinants of the project company’s hedging decision, 
which might affect this firm’s credit spread and capital structure (Haushalter et al., 2002). 
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the determinants of risk 
management practices in project finance deals. Many extant papers have studied how project 
companies optimally manage country-specific risks—e.g., political risk and legal risks—to 
reduce the default risk (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Vaaler et al., 2008; Corieli et al., 2010; 
Haniz and Klemeier, 2012). This paper complements this literature by studying determinants 
of the corporate hedging decision for the case of oil and gas development project finance.  
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies determinants of corporate risk 
management (Nance et al., 1993; Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Graham and Rogers, 2002; Kleffner et al., 2003; Keefe and Yaghoubi, 2016). Many papers in 
this literature have focused on non-energy firms, while we contribute to this literature by 
studying the determinants of an energy firm’s decision to hedge an oil price risk. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the overview of the recent trend in oil 
and gas project financing and develops main hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the 
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methodology, Section 4 the data, and Section 5 the regression result. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Overview and Hypotheses: Price Risk and Hedging in Oil and Gas Projects 
In this section, we discuss how the price risks of oil and gas as well as the likelihood of 
hedging such price risks in oil and gas development projects have fluctuated during our 
sample period. The price risk in the global oil and gas markets is highly likely to affect the 
systematic risks borne by investors in oil and gas markets, which would in turn increase the 
cost of funding oil and gas development projects. Facing the increased difficulty in raising 
capital, oil and gas project companies are likely to more actively engage in mitigating their 
business risks by shifting these risks to other stakeholders (e.g., buyers of oil and gas). As 
such, we develop hypotheses about determinants of the project company’s hedging likelihood, 
i.e., how global risk factors and firm characteristics are likely to affect the company’s 
incentive for hedging the price risk.  
2.1. Risk of Oil and Gas Prices 
  We begin by examining how the oil and gas prices fluctuated during the sample period 
from January 1996 to October 2011. Figure 1 plots the monthly time series of oil and gas 
prices in the US spot markets, where we use West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) spot 
price as the oil price, and Henry Hub natural gas (HH) spot price as the gas price. We can see 
that both oil and gas prices were quite volatile. For instance, both the oil and gas prices 
increased almost sixfold during the period from January 2002 to June 2008, and then plunged 
substantially until May 2009. 
Figure 1: Monthly Series of Oil and Gas Prices, January 1996-October 2011 
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Note: this figure plots monthly series of prices of oil (WTI, in US dollars per barrel, left scale) and gas (HH, in US dollars 
per million BTU, right scale), respectively, traded in the U.S. (spot) markets.  
 
We proceed to examining how the price volatility of oil and gas, respectively, has changed 
over time. We calculate the monthly volatility of oil and gas prices as the standard deviation 
of the log of the daily price of oil and gas, respectively, for a given month. Table 1 presents 
such monthly price volatilities, on average for a given year.  
Table 1: Volatility of Oil and Gas Prices, 1996-2011  
Year Oil Price Volatility Gas Price Volatility 
1996 0.041  0.099  
1997 0.034  0.081  
1998 0.044  0.032  
1999 0.108  0.063  
2000 0.037  0.155  
2001 0.062  0.176  
2002 0.054  0.090  
2003 0.031  0.051  
2004 0.058  0.034  
2005 0.047  0.126  
2006 0.034  0.061  
2007 0.075  0.038  
2008 0.147  0.099  
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2009 0.101  0.077  
2010 0.025  0.061  
2011 0.033  0.051  
Average 0.058  0.081  
Standard Deviation 0.034  0.042  
Note: The volatility of oil and gas prices, respectively, is measured as the standard deviation of the daily logged prices of oil 
and gas, respectively, for a given month, which is averaged for a given year. The crude oil (WTI) spot price series is used for 
the oil price, and the Henry Hub (HH) natural gas spot price for the gas price.  
 
Table 1 shows that for both oil and gas, the price volatility has changed substantially over 
time: its standard deviation is about 3.4 percentage points, compared to its mean of 5.8 
percentage points. Indeed, the price volatility exhibits ups and downs, especially peaks in 
2001 and in 2008, respectively. In particular, consider the period around the peak in 2008: the 
price volatility has greatly increased from 2003 to 2009 and then substantially decreased 
thereafter. An increase in the price volatility is likely to increase the cash-flow volatility of oil 
and gas development projects, making it more difficult to fund these projects. This might 
have provided oil and gas project companies with stronger incentives to hedge the price risk. 
As such, we examine the changes in the oil and gas project companies’ hedging decisions. 
2.2. Risk Management  
In this section, we discuss the key features of a project finance loan and examine the 
overall trend in the risk management practices in oil and gas development projects. A project 
finance loan is a non-recourse (or limited-recourse) debt made to a project company that is 
established for a particular investment project and legally independent of the sponsor 
company (Esty, 2004; Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012; Byoun et al., 2013); a sponsor refers to the 
project company’s main shareholder. As such, in the event of default, the lender can not force 
the sponsor to pay the unpaid portion of the project company’s debt obligation. Moreover, for 
a project finance loan, the leverage ratio is often quite high, about 70 percent (Esty and Sesia, 
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2011). Thus, the lender of a project finance loan bears a high level of credit risks.  
Therefore, the lenders usually require the borrower to arrange various risk-management 
contracts so that the project company’s credit risk should be reduced to a bearable level 
(Corielli et al., 2010). For instance, in project finance deals, a number of different contracts 
are arranged to manage various risks: (i) either construction agreement or engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) agreement to hedge the risk of construction of a 
production facility, (ii) operation and management (O&M) agreement to hedge the 
operational risk after the production facility completed, and (iii) offtake agreement to hedge 
the price risk of produced output, and (iv) supply agreement to hedge the price risk of inputs.  
In practice, the usage of such various risk-management contracts differs across 
companies and over time. The reason is, of course, that the benefits net costs of arranging 
risk-management contracts might differ among companies and change over time. For 
instance, the changes in the global risk factors could greatly affect the incentive for hedging 
these risks: e.g., an increase in the current volatility of the oil price might increase the benefit, 
and hence likelihood, of hedging the risk of future oil prices.  
We examine how oil and gas project companies’ decisions to use various risk 
management contracts have changed over time. Table 2 provides the annual empirical 
likelihood to use each of various risk management contracts in oil and gas project finance 
deals over the period 1996-2011. The likelihood to use a particular risk management contract 
(e.g., offtake contract) is measured as follows: Consider oil and gas project finance loan 
tranches made for a given year. We calculate the fraction of loan tranches, in terms of the 
number of tranches, for which the risk management contract is arranged as of the loan date. 
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Table 2: Likelihood of Risk Management, Oil and Gas Projects, 1996-2011 
Year 
Number of 
Project Loan 
Tranches  
Likelihood to Use Risk Management Contracts 
Offtake 
Contract 
EPC 
Contract 
Construction 
Contract 
O&M 
Contract 
Supply 
Contract 
1996 73 0.137 0.055 0.164 0.068 0.000 
1997 82 0.183 0.366 0.183 0.049 0.000 
1998 91 0.044 0.165 0.231 0.231 0.033 
1999 93 0.258 0.376 0.269 0.226 0.301 
2000 95 0.116 0.179 0.105 0.116 0.126 
2001 36 0.083 0.306 0.056 0.361 0.000 
2002 55 0.455 0.418 0.000 0.109 0.109 
2003 98 0.296 0.306 0.000 0.122 0.071 
2004 159 0.201 0.497 0.189 0.101 0.038 
2005 134 0.299 0.299 0.067 0.127 0.060 
2006 125 0.096 0.192 0.016 0.008 0.000 
2007 133 0.331 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.045 
2008 167 0.539 0.575 0.000 0.096 0.108 
2009 168 0.435 0.518 0.024 0.000 0.018 
2010 148 0.169 0.399 0.027 0.061 0.061 
2011 195 0.174 0.303 0.000 0.005 0.031 
Avgerage 116 0.238 0.320 0.083 0.105 0.063 
Std Dev 45 0.144 0.144 0.094 0.098 0.076 
Note: this table presents the annual likelihood to use each of various risk management contracts in oil and gas project finance 
loans over the period 1996-2011. The likelihood of an offtake contract is measured as the number of project loan tranches for 
which an offtake contract is arranged as of the loan date, divided by the total number of project loan tranches made for a 
given year. Likelihood of other types of risk management contracts is calculated in the same way. The data source is 
Dealogic ProjectWare. Std Dev refers to the standard deviation across years. 
 
Table 2 shows that for each of various risk management contracts, its empirical 
likelihood fluctuates substantially over time. For instance, the likelihood to use an offtake 
contract has the standard deviation of about 14 percentage points, sizable compared to its 
sample mean of 24 percentage points. In particular, the likelihood to use an offtake contract 
exhibits peaks in 2002 and in 2008, synchronous with the price volatility peaks in 2001 and 
in 2008, respectively. This motivates us to investigate the effect of the oil price volatility on 
the likelihood that a project company hedges the risk of future oil prices. 
2.3. Incentives for Hedging: Oil and Gas Projects 
  In this section, we discuss hypotheses about the determinants of the oil and gas project 
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company’s likelihood to hedge the risk of future prices of oil and gas. 
2.3.1. Price Volatility and Corporate Incentive for Hedging  
We expect that in response to an increase in the hedging benefit of an offtake contract, 
every project company is more likely to adopt an offtake contract. To empirically test this 
hypothesis, we need the exogenous changes in the determinants of the hedging benefit of an 
offtake contract. The changes in the volatility of oil and gas prices are suitable for this 
purpose. As such, we present the main testable hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The volatility of oil and gas prices increases the likelihood that a project 
company uses an offtake contract to hedge the risk of future prices of oil and gas. 
  This hypothesis is intended to clarify whether or not the risk management practices of oil 
and gas development project companies are proactive, and hence sensitive, to the risk 
relevant to the company’s core business: production and sales of oil and gas. Thus, it would 
shed light on the issues of whether or not (i) the practices of corporate risk management are 
firms’ optimal responses to their business risks and (ii) shareholders prefer corporate hedging 
despite the availability of hedging on their own.  
2.3.2 Sponsor Company’s Willingness to Hedge the Oil Price Risk 
Note that in response to an increase in the oil price volatility, an oil project company’s 
hedging likelihood is expected to increase, especially to a greater extent for the case in which 
the company’s shareholders (i.e., the oil project company’s sponsor company) have the 
stronger willingness to reduce their exposures to the oil price risk. The reason is that the 
project company’s hedging helps to stabilize the sponsor’s dividend income received from the 
project.  
The key issue is which sponsor company has the stronger willingness to stabilize its 
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dividend income received from its subsidiary project company.
2
 We assume that the 
sponsor’s stock return sensitivity to the changes in the oil (or gas) price is negatively related 
to the degree of the sponsor’s willingness to avoid the oil (or gas) price risk: i.e., the 
sponsor’s smaller oil beta indicates that the sponsor has more actively managed its exposure 
to the oil price risk, which is in turn due to the sponsor’s stronger willingness to avoid the oil 
price risk (equivalently, the smaller appetite for the oil price risk). Thus, we expect that the 
smaller the sponsor’s oil beta observed in the near past, the greater the sensitivity of the 
project company’s hedging likelihood to the oil price volatility. 
Hypothesis 2: The sponsor company’s willingness to reduce its exposure to the risk of oil 
and gas prices increases the sensitivity of the project company’s hedging likelihood to the 
volatility of oil and gas prices. 
3. Methodology: Determinants of the Project Company’s Hedging Likelihood  
In this section, we discuss (i) how to measure the sponsor company’s willingness to avoid 
the risk of future prices of oil and gas, and (ii) how to estimate the determinants of the project 
company’s hedging likelihood.  
3.1. Sponsor Company’s Willingness to Hedge the Risk of Oil and Gas Prices 
Throughout this paper, a sponsor company indicates the given project company’s main 
shareholder, and we take the sponsor company’s stock-return sensitivity to the rate of changes 
in the oil (or gas) prices, observed in the period before the loan date, as the inverse measure 
of the sponsor company’s willingness to reduce its exposure to the risk of future prices of oil 
(or gas).  
                                           
2 Understanding the causes of differences in energy firms’ risk management practices can help the government 
to introduce more effective policies tailored by the firm-level incentives and challenges. 
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More specifically, consider sponsor company j of oil (or gas) project company i. Let 𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
denote the daily stock return for sponsor company j on a date t, where sponsor company j can 
have multiple projects over different periods. As in Jin and Jorion (2006) and Sadorsky 
(2001), we write the two-factor regression model of the sponsor company’s stock returns, 
depending on whether the project belongs to oil vs. gas sector (i.e., equation (1) is used for an 
oil development project, and equation (2) for a gas development project), as: 
R𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑅𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                       (1) 
R𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑅𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                        (2)  
where 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡  is the daily return to the market portfolio of a stock market where the 
sponsor’s stocks are mainly traded, 𝑅𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡  the daily return to the near-month WTI futures 
price of oil, and 𝑅𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑡  the daily return to the near-month HH futures price of gas. Sponsor 
j’s oil and gas betas (𝛽𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑖,𝑗, 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖,𝑗) are specific to the combination of project and sponsor 
(i,j): the sponsor’s oil beta is allowed to differ between projects developed at different periods. 
3.1.1. Estimation period: One-Year Window, Ending Six Months Before the Loan Date 
For a given project i, we estimate the sponsor company j’s stock-return sensitivity to the 
changes in the logged prices of oil and gas, labeled oil and gas beta, respectively, during a 
one-year period, ending six months before the loan date. The primary purpose of estimating 
the sponsor company’s oil and gas beta is to use it as an informative predictor of the project 
company’s hedging decision. To this end, the estimation period of the sponsor company’s oil 
and gas beta should be close to the loan date (so that the prediction power of such an 
estimated oil and gas beta is strong) and sufficiently earlier than the loan date to minimize the 
concern that during period close to the loan date (e.g., six-month period, ending on the loan 
date) the sponsor’s observed exposure to the oil risk could be affected by the news about the 
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expected hedging policies of a project company. In our baseline case, this estimation period 
ends six months before the loan date. As for the length of the estimation period, we choose 
one-year window. That is, in the estimation, we use the sponsor’s stock returns during the 
period from t = -545 to t = -180, where t refers to the number of calendar days compared to 
the loan date.
3
  
Our choice of the sample period of one year is shorter than those used in the literature that 
studies the impact of the oil price shocks on the energy firms’ stock returns (e.g., one-, two- 
or five-years). (See, e.g., Basher and Sadorsky (2006)). The reason is that our estimated oil 
and gas betas are intended to capture the effects of the events occurring near the loan date on 
the sponsor’s stock returns so that our estimated oil and gas betas are informative in 
predicting the sponsor’s decisions made around the loan application period.  
3.2. Determinants of the Project Company’s Hedging Likelihood 
  We focus on investigating the determinants of the likelihood that a project company uses 
an offtake contract to hedge the oil (or gas) price risk. We use a logit regression method to 
estimate the offtake-adoption likelihood where the offtake dummy is equal to one if an 
offtake contract is arranged as of the loan date and zero otherwise. Let 𝑝 denote the offtake-
adoption probability. The logit regression equation is written as: 
log (
𝑝
[1 − 𝑝]
) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 ×  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦                                                                  
                    + 𝛿2 ×  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×  𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟
′𝑠 𝑜𝑖𝑙 & 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 
                                           +𝛿3 ×  𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟
′𝑠 𝑜𝑖𝑙 & 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝑿′𝜸 + 𝜀                                  (3) 
                                           
3 We have also considered an alternative estimation window of the sponsor’s oil and gas beta: one-year window 
ending one day before the loan date. This case does not make a real difference to the main results, which are 
presented in section A in Online Appendix. 
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where the dependent variable is the log of odds that for a given project loan tranche, an 
offtake contract is used. The control variable Price volatility refers to the volatility of (logged) 
price of oil and gas, respectively, depending on the project’s sector, and Sponsor’s oil & gas 
beta the (estimated) sensitivity of the sponsor’s stock returns to the rate of changes in the oil 
(or gas) price, depending on the project’s sector.  
  It is of our main interest to examine whether or not the price volatility increases the 
hedging likelihood. In particular, we aim to investigate whether or not the sponsor company’s 
exposure to the oil (or gas) risk is systemically related to the effect of the price volatility on 
the subsidiary project company’s decision to hedge the oil (or gas) price risk. That is, we aim 
to test whether or not the interaction term between the price volatility and the sponsor’s oil 
and gas beta significantly enters the logit regression of the hedging likelihood.   
  The control vector X includes the standard control variables that could affect the hedging 
incentives and are as follows: (i) microeconomic characteristics of the individual loan tranche 
of observation (e.g., size and maturity of a loan tranche, and currency risk and refinancing 
dummies); (ii) the total size of multiple loan tranches made to a given project as a proxy for 
the project size (Pierru et al., 2013); (iii) the host country’s constant credit quality (S&P 
credit rating) and time-varying government bond spread, where these two are proxies for 
various regional factors specific to the host country where the project is located; and (iv) 
global factors such as the annual growth rate of the price of the one-year maturity futures 
contract, and the after-crisis dummy that indicates whether or not the loan is made during the 
period after the 2007-2008 financial crisis episode. The after-crisis dummy (set to one for a 
loan made after 2008) is intended to capture the effect of substantial changes in the loan 
market environment after this crisis, e.g., stricter risk management requirements imposed on 
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bank loans by the new regulation. (See Appendix for a list of definitions of variables, and 
Section 4.2 for construction of variables.) 
3.2.1 Robustness Check I: Unobserved Credit Risk  
For robustness check, we examine whether or not the main regression results are biased 
due to the omitted variables problem, e.g., an unobserved component of the project 
company’s credit risk, which is likely to affect the company’s offtake-adoption decision. It is 
well known that for a project finance loan, the event of default occurs mostly at the pre-
completion stage when the production facility is not yet completed (Sorge, 2004). For 
instance, the construction cost happens to exceed what was initially expected, which leads to 
default of the project loan. To reduce a pre-completion default risk, a project company often 
adopts a turnkey-based engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract of which 
counterparty guarantees that the production facility will be completed by an agreed date at the 
fixed cost. Given that an EPC contract is effective in reducing the project’s default risk, a 
project company with the higher (unobservable) credit risk is more likely to use an EPC 
contract. Thus, we run the regression of the EPC-adoption dummy on the control variables 
that enter the offtake-adoption regression, from which residuals are controlled for, if needed, 
as a proxy for the project company’s unobserved credit risk in the main regression of the 
offtake-adoption dummy.  
3.2.2 Robustness Check II: Upstream vs. Downstream Projects 
For robustness check, we also examine how the main results are affected by controlling for 
the interaction term between the price volatility and the upstream dummy, which captures the 
difference, if any, between upstream and downstream projects in the effect of the price 
volatility on the hedging likelihood. The reason is mainly about the possible difference 
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between upstream and downstream energy firms in their capabilities to absorb the price 
shocks, which might affect their hedging incentives. In the downstream industries of oil and 
gas, firms are likely to have market power due to strategies for management of distribution 
channels and inventory adjustment, which would provide downstream firms with operational 
capabilities to absorb the price shocks. By contrast, upstream firms (i.e., producers of crude 
oil and natural gas) compete in the global market and hence have almost no room to absorb 
the price shocks. As such, in the upstream industry, the likelihood of hedging may respond to 
an increase in the price volatility more sensitively than in the downstream industry. 
4. Data 
4.1. Data on Sponsor Company’s Stock Return and Its Determinants 
   The data on daily returns to sponsor companies’ stocks and the corresponding market 
portfolio (where the sponsor’s stock is traded) comes from the Thomson Reuters DataStream 
database. The sponsor’s company code is provided by the Energy Intelligence database. 
4.1.1. Statistics of Sponsor Company’s Stock Returns and Two Risk Factors 
Table 3 provides summary statistics, over the period of January 1995–November 2011, of 
the average stock return across top-20 sponsor companies (sorted by the total size of their 
project loans) and the two systemic risk factors: (i) return to the market portfolio
4
, and (ii) 
return to the near-month maturity futures price of oil (or gas); all these returns are at the daily 
frequency over a one-year period, ending six months before the loan date. 
From Table 3, we can see that the sponsor’s stock return, on average across sponsors for a 
given day, is quite volatile: its standard deviation is about 0.95 percentage points, whereas the 
standard deviation of returns to the market portfolio is about 1.1 to 2.2 percentage points; the 
                                           
4 The market portfolio is for the stock market where the sponsor company’s stocks are mainly traded. 
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average sponsor’s stock return is positively correlated both with the market returns and with 
the rates of changes in the futures prices of oil and gas. 
Table 3: Daily Returns to Sponsors’ Stocks, Market Portfolio, and Oil & Gas Prices 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
   Mean Median SD Min Max 
Sponsor company’s stock return (average cross 
companies) 
0.06% 0.008% 0.95% -7.9% 13.5% 
First risk factor: return to the market portfolio 
     
   Return to the market portfolio: NYMEX (US) 
0.3% 0.3% 1.1% -9.0% 11.5%
Return to the market portfolio: FTSE100 (UK) 
0.2% 0.4% 1.5% -9.9% 12.7% 
Return to the market portfolio: NIKKEI (Japan) 
0.0% 0.0% 1.3% -8.6% 12.1% 
Return to the market portfolio: KOSPI (Korea) 
0.0% 0.0% 2.2% -19.2% 30.1% 
Second risk factor 
     
 Return to the futures price of oil 
0.0% 0.0% 2.2% -15.2% 17.8% 
 Return to the futures price of gas 
0.0% 0.0% 3.5% -31.3% 18.1% 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients 
 
Avg. 
Sponsor’s 
Stock 
Return 
NYMEX 
(US) 
FTSE100 
(UK) 
NIKKEI 
(Japan) 
KOSPI 
(Korea) 
Oil 
Futures 
Price 
Avg. Sponsor’s Stock Return 1 
     
NYMEX (US) 0.628** 1 
    
FTSE100 (UK) 0.597** 0.511** 1 
   
NIKKEI (Japan) 0.335** 0.026** 0.182** 1 
  
KOSPI (Korea) 0.192** 0.238** 0.236** 0.005 1 
 
Oil Futures Price 0.302** 0.142** 0.197** 0.051** 0.037** 1 
Gas Futures Price 0.106** 0.027** 0.039** 0.038** -0.012 0.221** 
Note: Sample period is from January 1995 to November 2011. Panel A provides statistics of the average stock return 
across top-20 sponsors and returns to the two pricing factors. Returns are measured as the daily (not annualized) changes in 
the log of prices; stock returns includes dividend payments. Panel B provides the correlation coefficients among the average 
sponsor’s stock return and returns to the two pricing factors. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
4.1.2. Sponsor’s Exposures to Oil vs. Non-Oil Risks 
We estimate the sponsor’s oil and gas betas, which enter the sponsor’s return equation (1) 
and (2), respectively, by using the OLS method. Table 4 presents the estimation results for 
top-20 sponsors; this table also provides information on the sponsor company’s non-oil risks 
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(e.g., total risk and market beta) and the likelihood that oil and gas project companies, owned 
by a given sponsor company, adopt offtake contracts to hedge the risk of oil and gas prices.  
Table 4: Sponsor’s Risk Exposures and Project Company’s Hedging Likelihood 
Rank 
Sponsor:  
Company Name 
Project size 
(constant 
US$ mil.) 
Sponsor’s 
Oil & Gas 
Beta 
Sponsor’s  
Stock Return 
Volatility (%) 
Sponsor’s 
Market 
Beta 
Offtake- 
Adoption of 
Projects 
1 GAZPROM 60,861 0.100 3.302 0.566 31% 
2 TOTAL 52,173 0.090 1.417 0.678 47% 
3 EXXON MOBIL 25,619 0.053 0.857 1.088 40% 
4 MOBIL 11,522 0.095 1.345 0.786 10% 
5 MARUBENI 11,004 -0.020 0.214 0.772 33% 
6 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 8,733 0.039 0.832 0.490 82% 
7 CHEVRON 6,988 0.106 0.908 0.389 0% 
8 PETROBRAS 5,960 0.094 0.624 0.665 11% 
9 PETRONAS GAS 5,896 0.047 0.197 0.559 24% 
10 COASTAL CRBN.OILS&MRLS. 5,836 -0.039 0.314 0.179 60% 
11 AMER. ELEC. PWR. 5,655 0.021 1.418 0.717 10% 
12 PHILLIPS 5,424 -0.006 1.075 0.545 38% 
13 SK 5,134 0.191 12.291 0.605 25% 
14 E.ON 5,033 -0.022 1.929 0.593 45% 
15 REPSOL YPF 4,853 0.021 0.693 0.584 71% 
16 GOLDMAN SACHS 4,769 0.055 8.828 0.402 17% 
17 ENBRIDGE 4,607 0.025 0.451 0.734 30% 
18 EL PASO ELEC. 4,380 -0.025 0.987 0.346 33% 
19 CHENIERE EN. 3,540 0.149 1.101 0.799 40% 
20 MITSUI 3,334 0.052 0.910 0.691 18% 
 Mean 12,066 0.051 1.985 0.609 33% 
 Standard deviation 16,022 0.061 3.064 0.197 21% 
Correlation Matrix 
 Project size 1.00      
 Sponsor’s Oil & Gas Beta 0.15  1.00     
 Sponsor’s Stock Return Volatility -0.10  0.51  1.00    
 Sponsor’s Market Beta 0.33  0.29  -0.14  1.00   
 Offtake Adoption of Projects 0.17  -0.35  -0.20  -0.15  1.00  
Note: this table provides the estimated oil and gas betas of (loans-size-sorted) top-20 sponsor companies where oil and gas 
beta refers to the sensitivity of the sponsor’s stock returns to the changes in the logged (near-moth futures) price of oil and 
gas, respectively. Sponsor’s daily stock returns are regressed on returns to the market portfolio (where the sponsor’s stocks 
are mainly traded) and returns to oil (or gas) prices, over a one-year period, ending six months before the loan date. The size 
of oil and gas projects owned by a given sponsor company is in terms of constant 1985 US dollars (million). 
 22 
 
  As shown by Table 4, top-20 sponsors, which are of relatively large sizes and hence 
presumably comparable across each other, exhibit substantial variations in (i) their levels of 
estimated oil and gas beta (their sample mean is 5.1 percentage points and standard deviation 
is 6.1 percentage points) and (ii) the likelihood that project companies, owned by a given 
sponsor company, use offtake contracts: it has sample mean of 33 percent percentage points 
and standard deviation of 21 percent percentage points. 
It is interesting to see that a sponsor company’s stock-return volatility, labeled sponsor’s 
total risk, is highly positively correlated with the sponsor’s own oil and gas beta (i.e., their 
correlation coefficient is 0.51), while it is weakly and negatively correlated with the sponsor’s 
own market beta (i.e., their correlation coefficient is -0.14). This suggests that the price risk 
of oil and gas might be an important source, other than the market risk, of total risks faced by 
these sponsor companies.  
Furthermore, we can see that a sponsor’s oil and gas beta is highly and negatively 
correlated with the likelihood that its subsidiary project companies hedge risks of oil and gas 
prices by adopting offtake contracts (i.e., their correlation coefficient is about -0.35).  
Taken together, these facts suggest that the sponsor’s oil and gas beta could be an important 
factor in determining the hedging decision of its subsidiary project company.
5
 
4.2. Data on Project Loans and Hedging Decision 
4.2.1. Data Source  
The data on project finance loans comes from Dealogic ProjectWare database, the same 
one studied in Corielli et. al (2010). This database provides comprehensive descriptions about 
                                           
5 Both the sponsor’s total risk and market beta are also negatively correlated with the offtake-adoption of 
projects (their correlation coefficients are -0.20 and -0.15, respectively). In section B in Online Appendix, we 
provide the offtake-adoption regression results that the coefficient on the interaction term between the price 
volatility and the sponsor’s total risk (or sponsor’s market beta) is not significant. 
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project finance loans: characteristics of an individual project and details about counterparties 
and sponsors of a given project. Main characteristics of a given project are written in a text 
format, which we manually encode. 
Project finance loans are often used to fund a large-scale development project. The three 
main sectors, by the project loan size, are (i) power plant, (2) transportation infrastructure, 
and (3) oil and gas development (based on the authors’ calculation, data source: Thomson 
Reuters Project Finance International).  
We focus on project finance loans made to oil and gas development projects. Industries 
that belong to the oil and gas sectors are as follows: First, the oil sector includes (i) oilfield 
exploration and development, (ii) oil pipeline, and (iii) oil refinery industries. Second, the gas 
sector includes (iv) gas exploration and development, (v) gas pipeline, and (vi) gas 
distribution industries. We set the gas sector dummy to one if a project’s industry belongs to 
the gas sector, and to zero otherwise.  
Note that the oil and gas industries can be also classified either as the upstream or as the 
downstream industry. More specifically, the upstream industry refers to the two industries 
related to the exploration and extraction of oil and gas: (i) oilfield exploration and 
development, and (iv) gas exploration and development, for which the upstream dummy is 
set to one. Meanwhile, the downstream industry is related to refining and marketing and 
includes the other four industries, for which the upstream dummy is set to zero.  
The sample period is from April 1996 to October 2011 (in terms of the loan date). The 
sample includes 328 loans made to oil and gas development projects in 30 countries. 
The unit of a sample observation is a loan tranche as in Corielli et. al (2010), whereas a 
project is sometimes financed via multi-tranche loans. As such, two or three loan tranches are 
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sometimes observed for a given project. Thus, in our regression analysis, we report standard 
errors robust to cross-sectional clustering for a given project. 
4.2.2. Hedging Decision Variables   
   The ProjectWare database reports information on various types of contractual 
arrangements that are widely used in project development to hedge various risks. In particular, 
an offtake agreement is of our main interest because it is an effective instrument to hedge the 
price risk. For a given project loan, we set the offtake adoption dummy to one if an offtake 
agreement has been already signed by counterparties as of the loan date, and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, we set the EPC dummy to one if an EPC agreement has been already signed by 
counterparties as of the loan date.  
4.2.3. Loan Characteristics  
We collect information on loan characteristics that are likely to affect the project 
company’s decision to hedge the price risk. For instance, we control for (i) loan tranche 
amount (in millions of constant 1985 U.S. dollars); (ii) maturity in years; (iii) the currency 
risk dummy that indicates whether or not the loan is subject to the currency risk: it is set to 
one if the currency of the loan denomination differs from the local currency of the host 
country where the project’s production facility is located; and (iv) refinancing dummy that 
indicates whether or not the loan is used in refinancing a project that had been financed 
previously: it is set to one in case of refinancing. 
4.2.4. Host Country’s Risk Factors   
We also control for the host country-level risk factors that are likely to affect the riskiness, 
and hence hedging likelihood, of the project. We use two variables to measure such a host 
country-level riskiness: the country’s constant credit rating and time-varying government 
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bond spread, which are proxies for various geopolitical risk factors such as political and legal 
risks studied in Hainz and Kleimeier (2012). It is of our interest to control for the overall 
level of a host country’s riskiness rather than specific risk sources (Bekaert et al., 2016). Thus, 
it suffices to control for constant and time-varying components of the country’s riskiness.  
More specifically, the time-varying component of the host country’s riskiness is measured 
as the spread of the country’s 10-year government bond yield relative to the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury rate, by using Thomson Reuters DataStream database; for countries that are not 
covered by Datastream, JP Morgan Global Bond Index database is used. The time-varying 
spread of the host country’s government bond is also supposed to capture the changes in the 
lenders’ risk appetite, if any, due to worsening financial market conditions.  
Meanwhile, the constant component (i.e., fixed-effect) of the host country’s riskiness is 
measured as Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating. We encode the S&P credit rating by 
assigning a higher value to a better credit quality (Corielli et. al, 2010): the host country’s 
credit quality is set to five for the best grade (from AAA to A+), four for the investment 
grade (from A to BBB−), three for the speculative grade (from BB+ to BB), two for the poor 
grade (from BB− to CC), and one for other grades such as default, unrated, or undisclosed. 
4.2.5. Global Factors: Volatility and Growth of Oil and Gas Prices 
Prices of oil and gas are quite volatile. An increase in the oil price volatility is likely to 
worsen the credit risk (the default probability and recovery rate) of an oil project company 
and hence increase the benefit of hedging the oil price risk. As such, we construct and control 
for the volatility of logged spot market prices of oil and gas, respectively, by using WTI 
crude oil spot price for the oil price and Henry Hub natural gas spot price for the gas price. 
More specifically, for a given loan tranche, we calculate the price volatility of oil and gas, 
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respectively, as the standard deviation of the log of the daily price over one-year period, 
ending one day before the loan date t. Oil and gas prices substantially differ in their 
magnitudes of volatilities. (See Table 1.) As such, we standardize them to have values from 
zero to one as follows: 
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =
𝜎𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 − 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑂𝑖𝑙  
𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑂𝑖𝑙 − 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑂𝑖𝑙
 ,   𝐺𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =
𝜎𝑡
𝐺𝑎𝑠 − 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝐺𝑎𝑠 
𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐺𝑎𝑠 − 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝐺𝑎𝑠                 (4) 
where 𝜎𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 refers to the standard deviation of the log of the daily oil prices over a one-year 
period (ending one day before the loan date), and 𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑂𝑖𝑙  and 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑂𝑖𝑙  the maximum and 
minimum values, respectively, over all observations of 𝜎𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙. The gas price volatility is 
measured in the same way. 
   Note that the changes in the expected level of the price in the future (e.g., next year) 
might also affect the project company’s hedging likelihood. Thus, we also control for the 
change in the futures price from one year ago, labeled (annual) growth in futures price, 
where the futures price refers to the delivery price of the one-year maturity futures contract, 
on average over the one-year period (ending one day before the loan date). We expect that in 
the hedging likelihood regression, the coefficient on futures price growth is negative because 
a higher growth in futures price is likely to reduce the credit risk and hence decrease the 
incentive for hedging. (See Appendix for a list of definitions of variables.) 
5. Results 
 In this section, we discuss statistics of key variables and main results for the logit 
regression of the hedging dummy. We also discuss results for robustness check, especially 
those for the case in which the sponsor’s non-oil general risk exposures are used instead of 
the sponsor’s oil and gas exposures. 
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5.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 5 presents summary statistics of project- and loan-level variables, respectively. The 
sample includes a total of 150 projects and a total of 328 loan tranches. For a given project, 
the ratio of the single loan size to the total size of loans is 37.7 percentage points on average 
(26.7 percentage points for the median), similar to those in Corielli et. al (2010) who examine 
project finance loans in all industries rather than those in the oil and gas industries. Other 
loan-level characteristics (e.g., maturity) and host country-level variables (e.g., government 
bond spread) also exhibit substantial variations. 
Panel B in Table 5 provides the correlation coefficients among the key variables that enter 
the hedging regression. We can see that both maturity and price volatility are positively 
correlated with the hedging dummy. 
Table 5: Statistics of Key Variables of Project Loans, April 1996 – October 2011 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max 
Project company-level characteristics       
  Project’s total loan size (US$ mil.) 150 847 396 1,377 5.8 9,289 
  Sponsor’s oil & gas beta 150 0.052  0.036  0.105  -0.129  0.962  
Microeconomic loan tranche-level 
characteristics  
      
  Tranche size/Project’s total loan size (%) 328 37.7 26.7 32.4 0.1 100.0 
  Tranche size (US$ mil.)       
    Unconditional 328 184 109 238 0.3 1,905 
    Conditional on w/ currency risk  191 203 119 267 1 190 
    Conditional on w/ refinancing 70 194  115  200  5  986  
  Maturity (years) 328 8.1 7.0 6.1 0.5 30.0 
Host country-level risk factors       
  Credit quality (S&P rating): constant 150 4.32 5 0.96 2 5 
  Gov’t bond spread (bps): time-varying 150  3.09  0.9 6.20  -4.15  40.60  
Global factors       
  Price volatility of oil and gas 150 0.289  0.199  0.258  0.016  0.996  
  Growth in futures price of oil and gas 150  0.045  0.111  0.308  -0.725  0.734  
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Panel B: Correlation Coefficients among Key Variables 
 
Offtake-
adoption 
dummy 
Tranche 
size 
Maturity 
Project’s 
total loan 
size 
Sponsor’s 
oil & gas 
beta 
Price 
volatility 
Offtake-adoption dummy 1 
     
Tranche size 
-0.045 1     
Maturity 
0.334* 0.178* 1    
Project’s total loan size 
0.145* 0.613* 0.300* 1   
Sponsor’s oil & gas beta 
-0.120* 0.145* -0.095 0.095 1  
Price volatility 
0.318* -0.091 0.172* -0.073 0.056 1 
Growth in futures price 
-0.057 -0.081 -0.008 -0.209* -0.113* 0.005 
 
Panel C: Statistics for Upstream vs. Downstream Industries 
  Obs.  
Offtake 
Dummy 
Tranche size 
(US$ mil.) 
Maturity 
(in years) 
Project’s total 
Loan Size 
(US$ mil.) 
Sponsor's 
 Oil & Gas Beta 
Upstream  188  0.35  193  8.8  986  0.066 
Downstream  140  0.31  171  7.2  696  0.047 
Note: this table provides summary statistics of the key variables that enter the regression equation of the project company’s 
hedging decision to adopt an offtake contract. SD refers to the standard deviation. Panel C presents averages of variables 
conditional on upstream vs. downstream industries, respectively. Project’s total loan size measures the total size of multiple 
loan tranches issued for a given project, and tranche size the size of an individual loan tranche, where such loan sizes are in 
millions of constant 1985 U.S. dollars. Currency risk refers to the case in which the denomination of the loan differs from 
the host country’s local currency, and refinancing the case in which the project of a loan was already previously financed. 
Sponsor’s oil & gas beta refers to the sponsor company’s estimated stock-return sensitivity to the changes in oil and gas 
prices. Global factors refer to the volatility of oil and gas (spot) prices and annual growth rate of oil and gas (futures) prices. 
   
Panel C in Table 5 presents averages of key variables conditional on upstream vs. 
downstream industries, respectively. We can see that the average likelihood of hedging by 
using an offtake contract is not largely different between the two industries: it is slightly 
higher for the upstream (35 percent) than for the downstream (31 percent). Similarly, in the 
upstream industry, loan size, maturity, and the sponsor’s oil and gas exposure are also of 
magnitude slightly greater than in the downstream industry. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of 
the hedging likelihood to the price volatility could be significantly different between the 
upstream and downstream industries, which will be examined in a regression analysis.  
5.2. Main Results: Determinants of the Offtake Adoption 
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 Table 6 presents the results for the logit regressions of the likelihood that for a given 
project loan, an offtake contract has been adopted by the project company to hedge the risk of 
future prices of oil (or gas). Column (1) in Table 6 provides the regression results without the 
interaction term between the price volatility and sponsor’s oil and gas beta, and columns 
(2)—(4) in Table 6 present the regression results by additionally controlling for such an 
interaction term.  
Table 6: Logit Regression of the Offtake Adoption 
Dependent variable Log of odds of the offtake adoption 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price volatility 1.494 2.604** 3.299** 2.093 
 
[1.028] [1.229] [1.296] [1.542] 
Price volatility × Sponsor’s oil & gas beta 
 
-14.034*** -23.828*** -23.533*** 
  
[6.260] [7.754] [9.169] 
Price volatility × Upstream dummy    1.415 
    [2.173] 
Sponsor’s oil & gas beta  2.220 4.864** 4.985* 
  [2.089] [2.119] [2.552] 
Upstream dummy    0.967 
    [0.839] 
Credit risk: EPC-likelihood residual   1.247*** 1.292*** 
   [0.176] [0.206] 
Growth in futures price 0.364 0.028 0.011 0.134 
 
[0.605] [0.645] [0.640] [0.689] 
Log of tranche size -0.327*** -0.300** -0.354*** -0.428*** 
  [0.125] [0.132] [0.136] [0.141] 
Log of project’s total loan size 0.296* 0.315* 0.337 0.391* 
  [0.173] [0.173] [0.214] [0.234] 
Maturity 0.107*** 0.093*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 
  [0.033] [0.035] [0.041] [0.043] 
Refinancing dummy -0.469 -0.444 -0.220 -0.073 
  [0.393] [0.399] [0.552] [0.586] 
Currency risk dummy 0.367 0.395 0.532 0.352 
  [0.396] [0.402] [0.490] [0.507] 
Host country: Credit quality  -0.990*** -1.075*** -1.427*** -1.497*** 
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  [0.275] [0.278] [0.367] [0.371] 
Host country: Gov’t bond spread -0.066** -0.072** -0.100*** -0.106*** 
  [0.030] [0.029] [0.038] [0.039] 
Gas sector dummy 1.891*** 1.744*** 2.280*** 3.099*** 
  [0.448] [0.491] [0.605] [0.677] 
After-crisis period dummy 0.979 1.178* 1.543** 2.051*** 
  [0.624] [0.682] [0.662] [0.799] 
Constant 0.277 0.628 0.848 0.099 
  [1.238] [1.127] [1.564] [1.604] 
Number of observations 328 328 328 328 
Log likelihood -153.12 -147.73 -114.96 -110.44 
Pseudo R-square 0.28 0.31 0.46 0.48 
Note: this table provides the results of estimating the logit regression of the project company’s decision to hedge the price 
risk by adopting an offtake contract, over the sample period of April 1996–October 2011. In this case, sponsor’s oil & gas 
beta, referring to the sponsor company’s stock-return sensitivity to changes in the logged prices of oil and gas, is estimated 
during a one-year period, ending six months before the loan date. The unit of observation is an individual loan tranche. 
Project’s total loan size refers to the total size of multiple loan tranches made to a given project. Price volatility refers to the 
one-year moving average of the daily volatility of prices of oil and gas, respectively. EPC-likelihood residual refers to the 
residual from the logit regression of the EPC-adoption dummy, a proxy for the project’s unobserved credit risk. Growth in 
futures price refers to the annual growth rate of the one-year maturity futures price of oil and gas, respectively. Host 
country’s credit rating refers to the S&P credit rating (higher value for a better credit quality) of a host country where the 
project’s production facility is located, and gov’t bond spread the spread of the host country’s 10-year maturity government 
bond yield relative to the maturity-matched U.S. Treasury rate. After-crisis period dummy indicates whether or not the loan 
is made after the 2007-2008 crisis episode, set to one if the loan is made after 2008. Standard errors are inside the bracket 
and robust to cross-sectional clustering for a given project. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and 
*** at the 1% level. 
  
From Table 6, we can find some insights as follows: an offtake contract is more likely to be 
used (i) in the gas sector than in the oil sector, (ii) in the high-risk (i.e., low-credit-quality) 
host country than in the low-risk (i.e., high-credit-quality) host country, (iii) for the long-term 
maturity loans than for the short-term maturity loans, and (iv) after the 2007-2008 crisis than 
before. The first finding about the positive coefficient on the gas sector dummy is consistent 
with the well-known fact that for gas development projects, lenders often require the project 
company to hedge the demand risk mainly due to the complexity of the price determinants in 
the natural gas market (Razavi, 2007). The second and third findings about the host country’s 
credit quality (i.e., constant credit rating) and loan maturity indicate that the offtake 
agreement could be an effective tool to reduce the project loan’s credit risk caused either by 
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geopolitical risk factors or by the long maturity. The fourth finding about the after-crisis 
dummy indicates that after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the loan market environment has 
substantially changed such that the required level of risk management has been increased so 
that after the crisis, oil and gas project companies are more likely to hedge the price risk than 
before. 
We turn to discussing the main results about the impact of the price volatility on the hedging 
likelihood. We can see that the price volatility increases the likelihood that the project 
company hedges the risk of future prices of oil and gas. An increase in the oil price volatility 
would increase the oil project company’s cash-flow volatility in the near future, implying that 
the sponsor company’s exposure to the oil price risk would also increase. In response, the 
sponsor company is more likely to let its subsidiary oil project company to hedge the oil price 
risk so that the effect of the oil price volatility on the sponsor company’s own oil risk 
exposure is mitigated. 
Next, we discuss the coefficient on the interaction term between the price volatility and the 
sponsor’s oil and gas beta.6 Regression results (2)—(4) in Table 6 show that this coefficient 
is negative and significant at the one percent level (where the direct effect of the sponsor 
company’s oil beta on the project’s hedging likelihood is controlled for). That is, in response 
to an increase in the oil price volatility, a sponsor with a smaller oil beta is more likely to let 
its subsidiary oil project company to hedge the oil price risk than an otherwise equivalent 
sponsor with a larger oil beta is. Note that a sponsor company with the stronger willingness to 
                                           
6 In section B in Online Appendix, we provide the offtake-adoption regression results for the case in which we 
replace the sponsor’s oil and gas beta by two measures of the sponsor’s non-oil risk exposure: sponsor’s return 
volatility (labeled total risk) and sponsor’s market beta. Results in this case (section B in Online Appendix) 
show that the coefficient on the interaction term between the price volatility and the sponsor’s total risk (or 
sponsor’s market beta) is not significant. 
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manage its own exposure to the oil price risk would have exerted more effort to insure its 
business and hence its frim value against the oil price shocks so that the company’s stock 
returns would have been less sensitive to the oil price shock. Thus, our findings suggest that a 
sponsor company’s willingness to reduce its own exposure to the oil price risk is also 
persistently observed in the case of its subsidiary project company’s risk management 
practices: the smaller the sensitivity of the sponsor company’s stock returns to the oil price 
risk, the higher the likelihood that its subsidiary project company will also hedge the oil price 
risk. Put differently, a sponsor company’s oil beta, which is easily observable, can be useful 
in predicting the subsidiary project company’s decision to hedge the oil price risk, which is 
valuable information to lenders, other investors and third parties involved in the project.   
  Our findings are robust to controlling for the unobserved component of the project’s 
credit risk. See regression results (3) and (4) in Table 6, compared to those in (2) in Table 6, 
where we additionally control for the residuals from the regression of an EPC-adoption 
likelihood as the proxy for the unobserved component of the project’s credit risk. (See Table 
8 for results for the logit regression of the EPC adoption.) First, we can see that the 
unobserved component of the project’s credit risk itself is significantly and positively 
associated with the project company’s offtake-adoption likelihood. That is, a project’s 
unobservable credit risk, if any, that increases the project’s default risk also increases the 
offtake-adoption likelihood, too. Second, the main estimation results (e.g., the coefficients on 
other control variables) are almost intact, especially the coefficient on the price volatility and 
the coefficient on the interaction term between the price volatility and sponsor’s oil and gas 
beta. Thus, our findings are not likely to be biased due to omitted variables correlated with 
the project’s unobserved credit risk. 
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Our findings are also robust to additionally controlling for the interaction term between the 
price volatility and the upstream dummy (where the upstream dummy itself is also controlled 
for). Results in this case, reported by the column regression (4) in Table 6, are almost the 
same with those in the baseline case of regression (3) in Table 6. 
Economic significance of coefficients in Table 6 are provided by Table 7, which presents 
the predicted probability of the offtake adoption calculated at means and its relative change 
from 25
th
 percentile to 75
th
 percentile. The marginal effect of an increase in the interaction 
term between the price volatility and the sponsor’s oil and gas beta in the fourth column of 
Table 6 is associated with a decrease of 5.13 percentage points in the probability of offtake 
adoption in Panel B of Table 7. For comparison, the marginal effect of an increase in the price 
volatility itself increases the offtake-adoption probability by 0.39 percentage points.  
Table 7: Predicted Probability of The Offtake Adoption 
Panel A: Predicted probability of the offtake adoption at means 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price volatility 0.314 0.549** 0.605*** 0.387 
Price volatility × Sponsor’s oil & gas beta 
 
-2.964*** -4.376*** -5.094*** 
Price volatility × Upstream dummy    0.261 
Sponsor’s oil & gas beta  0.468 0.893** 0.922** 
Upstream dummy    0.178 
Credit risk: EPC-likelihood residual   0.229*** 0.239*** 
 
Panel B : Change in the predicted probability of the offtake adoption from 25
th
 percentile to 75
th
 percentile 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 From To From To From To From To 
Price volatility 
0.27* 0.33 0.46*** 0.61** 0.26*** 0.82*** 0.10* 0.49 
[0.06] [0.15] [0.56] [0.39] 
Price volatility 
× Sponsor’s oil 
& gas beta 
  -2.50** -3.32** -1.89** -5.94*** -1.43 -6.56*** 
  [-0.82] [-4.05] [-5.13] 
Price volatility 
×  Upstream 
dummy 
      0.07 0.33 
      [0.26] 
Sponsor’s oil &   0.39 0.52 0.38** 1.21** 0.26 1.18* 
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gas beta   [0.13] [0.83] [0.92] 
Upstream 
dummy 
      0.05 0.23 
      [0.18] 
Credit risk: 
EPC-likelihood 
residual 
    0.09*** 0.31*** 0.06** 0.30*** 
    [0.20] [0.24] 
Note: Panel A reports predicted probabilities calculated when the independent variables are valued at the mean, based on the 
regression of Table 6. Panel B reports the change in predicted probabilities calculated when the independent variables are 
valued between 25th percentile and 75th percentile. The differences are inside the bracket. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.. 
 
   We have discussed earlier that main regression of the offtake-adoption likelihood are 
robust to controlling for the unobserved credit risk, for which proxy we have used the 
residual from the logit regression of the EPC adoption. We discuss the results for this logit 
regression of the EPC adoption. 
Table 8: Logit Regression of the EPC Adoption 
Dependent variable Log of odds of the EPC adoption 
Regression (1)   (2) 
Corresponding offtake-adoption regression 
Table 6 
Reg (3) 
  
Table 6 
Reg (4) 
Price volatility 0.639   0.669 
 
[1.083]   [1.290] 
Price volatility × Sponsor’s oil & gas beta 3.045   3.283 
 
[4.896]   [5.005] 
Price volatility × Upstream dummy    -0.471 
    [1.362] 
Sponsor’s oil & gas beta -4.779   -4.892 
 [2.957]   [3.019] 
Upstream dummy     0.651 
    [0.636] 
Growth in futures price 0.274   0.313 
 
[0.627]   [0.643] 
Log of tranche size -0.255*   -0.270* 
  [0.146]   [0.147] 
Log of project’s total loan size 0.763***   0.773*** 
  [0.184]   [0.188] 
Maturity 0.093***   0.095*** 
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  [0.027]   [0.026] 
Refinancing dummy -1.465***   -1.456*** 
  [0.394]   [0.389] 
Currency risk dummy 1.023**   0.973** 
  [0.376]   [0.377] 
Host country: Credit quality  0.400*   0.402* 
  [0.224]   [0.225] 
Host country: Gov’t bond spread 0.106*   0.097* 
  [0.056]   [0.055] 
Gas sector dummy 0.460   0.802 
  [0.441]   [0.541] 
After-crisis period dummy 1.133*   1.140* 
  [0.596]   [0.593] 
Constant -5.106***   -5.619*** 
  [1.347]   [1.427] 
Number of observations 328   328 
Log likelihood -156.01   -155.09 
Pseudo R-square 0.30   0.30 
Note: this table provides the results of estimating the logit regression of the project company’s decision to use an EPC 
contract to reduce the pre-completion default risk, over the sample period of April 1996–October 2011. The unit of 
observation is an individual loan tranche. Project’s total loan size refers to the total size of multiple loan tranches made to a 
given project. Price volatility refers to the one-year moving average of the daily volatility of prices of oil and gas, 
respectively. Sponsor’s oil & gas beta refers to the sponsor company’s past stock-return sensitivity to changes in the logged 
prices of oil and gas. Sponsor’s market beta refers to the sponsor company’s past stock-return sensitivity to returns to the 
market portfolio. Growth in futures price refers to the annual growth rate of the one-year maturity futures price of oil and 
gas, respectively. Host country’s credit rating refers to the S&P credit rating (higher value for a better credit quality) of a host 
country where the project’s production facility is located, and gov’t bond spread the spread of the host country’s 10-year 
maturity government bond yield relative to the maturity-matched U.S. Treasury rate. After-crisis period dummy indicates 
whether or not the loan is made after the 2007-2008 crisis episode, set to one if the loan is made after 2008. Standard errors 
are inside the bracket and robust to cross-sectional clustering for a given project. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Table 8 presents the results for the logit regression of the EPC adoption: regression (1) and 
(2) in Table 8 corresponds, respectively, to regression (3) and (4) in Table 6. From Table 8, 
we can see that the relationships between EPC-adoption likelihood and the loan 
characteristics (such as maturity, refinancing dummy and currency risk dummy) are 
significant (at the five percent level), and that the sponsor’s oil and gas beta and price 
volatility are not significantly associated with the EPC-adoption likelihood. These findings 
suggest that the adoption of EPC arrangements is related to a project’s unobserved credit risk, 
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for which loan-specific characteristics matter, but not necessarily related to the project’s 
exposure to the price risk of oil and gas. The reason is that the adoption of EPC arrangements 
is not effective in hedging the price risk of oil and gas. 
5.3. Discussion 
5.3.1. Implications for Reputation of Risk Management and Cost of Funding 
Efficient ex-ante risk management techniques (e.g., risk managements discussed in 
Berkeley et al. (1991) and Zhi (1995)) can assist clients and project managers to assess and 
pre-empt potential sources of risk. Our findings suggest further long-run implications of 
efficient ex-ante risk management techniques as follows: Consider a sponsor company with a 
small oil beta, which highly values risk management and hence has already successfully 
insured the company’s own stock returns against the changes in the oil price. Our findings 
suggest that for such a sponsor company, its subsidiary project company is also likely to 
hedge the oil price risk, which would contribute to further protecting the sponsor company’s 
cash flow against the oil price risk. Thus, the sponsor company’s cash flow is expected to be 
protected from the oil price risk not only in the past but also in the future, which can greatly 
improve the sponsor company’s risk management reputation and hence substantially reduce 
the sponsor’s cost of funding projects.  
5.3.2. Robustness 
We discuss two factors related to the robustness of our findings. First, the delivery price of 
offtake contracts is important in affecting the demand and supply of offtake arrangements. 
Unfortunately, information on such a price is unavailable as it is highly confidential between 
the two counterparties signing each offtake contract. Note that in our regression analysis, we 
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control for growth in the futures price of oil (gas), which reflects changes in the global 
demand and supply of oil (gas) and may also capture, to some extent, changes in the demand 
and supply of oil (gas) offtake contracts. If the delivery price of offtake contracts diverges 
greatly from the futures price, then our analysis can not tell much about how such a price 
divergence between offtake and futures contracts would affect our main results. 
Second, in our study, the offtake decision variable is encoded as a dummy indicating 
whether or not the offtake arrangement exists. That is, we study the extensive margin, i.e., 
how many projects are likely to adopt offtake arrangements. There is another interesting 
dimension of the hedging policy: intensive margin, i.e., how much fraction of output is 
hedged, of which information is not provided by our data source. It would be interesting to 
study how differently the extensive and intensive margins respond to the price volatility, for 
which our analysis can not suggest anything due to the lack of data on the intensive margin.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper empirically studies the determinants of oil and gas project companies’ decisions 
to hedge the risk of future prices of oil and gas. We take the changes in volatilities of oil and 
gas prices as exogenous shocks to the cash-flow risk of oil and gas project companies. With a 
sample of 328 loans made to oil and gas development projects in 30 countries during 1996-
2011 period, we investigate whether or not volatilities of oil and gas prices increase the 
likelihood that oil and gas project companies hedge the price risk, especially how such a 
sensitivity of the hedging likelihood to the price volatility is related to the sponsor company’s 
exposure to the risk of oil and gas prices. 
We find that the price volatility of oil and gas significantly increases the hedging likelihood 
of an oil and gas project company. This result supports that corporate hedging sensitively 
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responds to the changes in the market environment relevant to the risk of the company’s 
future cash flows. Importantly, we also find that the sponsor company’s willingness to reduce 
its exposure specifically to the oil (or gas) price risk increases the sensitivity of an oil (or gas) 
project company’s hedging likelihood to the oil (or gas) price volatility.  
It would be interesting to investigate various channels through which risk management 
practices affect the energy firm’s market value, especially how differences in such an effect 
are related to investors’ risk appetite. We leave it for future work. 
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Appendix: Definitions of Variables 
Price volatility: standard deviation of the log of the daily oil (or gas) spot price during the 
one-year period, ending one day before the loan date, which is standardized so that it has 
values from zero to one. More specifically, the oil price volatility is measured as follows: 
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = (𝜎𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 − 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑂𝑖𝑙  )/(𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑂𝑖𝑙 − 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑂𝑖𝑙 ), where 𝜎𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙  refers to the standard 
deviation of the log of the daily oil prices over a one-year period ending one day before the 
loan date t, and 𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑂𝑖𝑙  and 𝜎𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑂𝑖𝑙  the maximum and minimum values, respectively, over all 
observations of 𝜎𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙. 
Sponsor’s oil and gas beta: sensitivity of the sponsor company’s stock price to the rate of 
changes in the near-month maturity futures price of oil (or gas), estimated by using the two-
factor regression model where the other factor is the returns to the market portfolio. The 
sponsor’s oil and gas beta is estimated using the sponsor’s daily stock returns during a one-
year period, ending six months before the loan date. 
Credit risk: EPC-likelihood residual: the residual from the logit regression of the EPC-
adoption dummy. 
Growth in futures price: rate of change in the one-year maturity futures price of oil (or gas) 
from one year ago. The futures price of oil (or gas) is measured as its average during a one-
year period, ending one day before the loan date. 
Log of tranche size: log of the loan tranche size, measured as the principal value in millions 
of constant 1985 U.S. dollars. 
Log of project’s total loan size: log of the total size of multiple loan tranches made to a 
 41 
 
given project. 
Maturity: the length (in years) of time from the loan date to the maturity date when the 
principle payment is scheduled.   
Refinancing dummy: dummy set to one if the loan is used to refinancing an existing project 
that were financed previously. 
Currency risk dummy: dummy set to one if the loan denomination currency differs from the 
local currency of the host country where the project’s production facility is located. 
Host country: Credit quality: constant (discrete) credit grade of a given host country 
assigned by the S&P, where a higher value is assigned to a better credit quality. 
Host country: Gov’t bond spread: time-varying (continuous) spread of the host country’s 
10-year government bond yield, relative to the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate. 
Gas sector dummy: dummy set to one if the project’s industry belongs to the gas sector, and 
zero for the oil sector. The gas sector includes (iv) gas exploration and development, (v) gas 
pipeline, and (vi) gas distribution industries; the oil sector includes (i) oilfield exploration and 
development, (ii) oil pipeline, and (iii) oil refinery industries. 
Upstream dummy: dummy set to one if the project belongs to the upstream industries and to 
zero if the project belongs to the downstream industries. More specifically, the upstream 
industries refer to exploration and extraction of oil and gas and include the two industries: (i) 
oilfield exploration and development and (iv) gas exploration and development industries. 
Other industries, related to refining and distribution, are defined as the downstream industry. 
After-crisis period dummy: dummy indicating whether or not the loan is made after 2007-
2008 financial crisis episode, equal to one if the loan is made after 2008, and zero otherwise. 
